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Abstract 
 
Secure software development processes are critical part of designing secure 
software. However, it is hard for the various stakeholders to make the decision about which 
software development process to choose without a comparison between them. Even 
further, after choosing the process, stakeholders have to decide which methods and 
techniques to use to fulfil activities required to develop secure software development 
processes. This is a problem, because there are a number of methods a stakeholder could 
use to fulfil these activities, but no explicit links between a method and development 
process. 
 In this thesis firstly we perform comparison of three secure system development 
approaches namely Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle, OWASP CLASP and 
Cigital’s Security Touchpoints. In the next step we focus on step within these approaches, 
namely the security risk management and carry out an analytical survey to find out current 
methods for security risk management. We give a short overview and comparison between 
found methods, which potentially will help stakeholders to select their approach for 
designing secure software with the focus on security risk analysis. We also provide them 
with opportunity to perform all activities required in risk analysis phase of the 
development by giving them an aggregate view of risk management methods. This is 
essential, because risk analysis is a major part of developing secure software and 
combining different techniques can be used to discover and mitigate more risks in software 
under development. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Security has a major role in developing software, but without guidelines it is hard to 
decide, which activities have to be implemented in order to develop secure software. A 
secure software process can be defined as the set of activities performed to develop, 
maintain, and deliver a secure software solution (Davis, 2006). These are a number of 
secure software processes available and although, they all have the same purpose, they are 
quite different in structure and activities, so it is hard to decide, which process is suitable 
for software under development. In this thesis we answer two research questions. The first 
question is: what are the differences between Security Development Lifecycle (Lipner & 
Howard, 2005), OWASP CLASP (Graham, 2006) and Cigital’s Security Touchpoints 
(McGraw, 2006) and the second question is: what are the current practices and methods for 
security risk management? 
 The purpose of this thesis is to make the comparison between three development 
processes for secure software: Security Development Lifecycle, OWASP CLASP and 
Cigital’s Security Touchpoints. Furthermore this thesis will provide a link between 
development processes and methods for security risk management. The link is made by 
performing a literature review to find out current methods and techniques chosen methods 
use for security risk management and by comparing the activities of the development 
processes to techniques of the chosen methods. Chosen methods are Secure i* ( Elahi, et 
al., 2010), SecReq (Houmb, et al., 2009), Secure Tropos (Giorgini, et al., 2007), UMLsec 
(Jürjens, 2002), SQUARE (Suleiman & Svetinovic, 2012), ISSRM domain model 
(Alcalde, et al., 2009)  and Misuse cases (Sindre & Opdahl, 2004). After reviewing these 
methods we combine their techniques into one general method that will cover all required 
activities in risk analysis phase. 
 The thesis is structured as follows. The first part introduces the background. In 
Chapter 2 we provide the summary and comparison tables to Security Development 
Lifecycle, OWASP CLASP and Cigital’s Security Touchpoints. In Chapter 3 we will give 
the design for the systematic literature review and in Chapter 4 we will perform the 
systematic literature review to find current practices and methods for security risk 
management. Moreover we will provide criteria to compare found methods and find out in 
which development process can these methods be implemented. In Chapter 5 we will 
provide an aggregate view on risk analysis and requirements and therefore contribution of 
this thesis. 
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Chapter 2. Security Development Processes 
There exist several approaches for developing secure software. In this chapter, we 
review three of these: Security Development Lifecycle (Lipner & Howard, 2005; Microsoft 
Developer Network, 2012), OWASP CLASP (Graham, 2006; OWASP 2, 2005; OWASP 
1, 2012) and Cigital’s Security Touchpoints (McGraw, 2006). The chapter concludes with 
their comparison.  
2.1 Security Development Lifecycle 
 
Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) came out in 2002, as a result of Microsoft’s 
commitment to improve the security of its operating system. Microsoft made the SDL to 
address the security issues they had to face in their products. SDL is a set of activities 
performed to develop and deliver a secure software solution. The SDL’s activities are 
grouped in stages. Although these stages are security specific, they are very alike to the 
software development phases. Several activities continue throughout the SDL process, for 
instance threat modelling and education. Doing so the SDL process focuses mainly on 
remaking and improving on going results. SDL provides thorough description to which 
method should be used to carry out activities so the execution of an activity can be 
achieved. 
Figure 1 - Seven phases of the traditional software development lifecycle define SDL 
process. (adapted from Microsoft, 2012) 
  Education is a major part of SDL. Every team member should have knowledge in 
software security in order to increase the awareness of the problem. Also mandatory 
advanced education is scheduled annually in order to keep up with the evolving field and 
new threats. SDL suggests instituting a measurement program to assess the effectiveness of 
knowledge received by training programs.  
  Security advisor is assigned to the project who serves as a point of contact, resource 
and guide as planning continues. This advisor helps the product team with security related 
issues and remains the team’s point of contact from the beginning to the software release. 
Furthermore, security team is assembled for frequent interactions during software 
development. SDL has devised a set of security metrics for product teams in order to 
monitor their success in implementing SDL.  
  SDL introduces a security risk assessment (SRA) as a mandatory exercise to 
identify functional aspects of the software that might require deep security review. SRA 
will determine which parts of the project will require threat modelling, which security 
design reviews and which penetration testing. SDL also recommends doing privacy 
requirements which measures the sensitivity of the data that software will process from a 
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privacy point of view. 
  Architectural and detailed design is performed mainly by threat modelling. SDL 
focuses on the impact of the project on user privacy and minimization of attack surface. To 
minimize attack surface discarding unnecessary features and limiting privileges is 
suggested.  SDL recommends STRIDE (STRIDE, 2007) to evoke threats. STRIDE stands 
for spoofing (impersonating something or someone else), tampering (modifying data or 
code), repudiation (claiming to have not performed an action), information disclosure 
(exposing information to someone not authorized to see it), denial of service (deny or 
degrade service to users), elevation of privileges (gain capabilities without proper 
authorization). It also provides all the resources and documents to carry out this technique. 
SDL also recommends a security expert to review the architecture of the system from 
security point of view.  
  SDL suggests applying coding and testing standards for implementation and 
testing. Coding standards help developers to avoid flaws that can lead to security 
vulnerabilities. Testing standards help to ensure that testing focuses on detecting potential 
security risks. Furthermore automated tools are suggested to detect minor errors. It also 
suggests conducting manual code reviews in order to supplement automated tools. SDL 
has heavy emphasis on fuzz testing tools, which unlike the static code-scanning tools must 
be built for each file format and because of this they are able to find errors missed by static 
analysis tools. The testing mainly covers only black box testing. SDL also describes 
security push to ensure that the final software meets the requirements and allow deeper 
review of any legacy code.  
  During the release phase, the software should be subject to a Final Security Review 
("FSR"). The FSR is an independent review of the software conducted by the central 
security team for the organization. If FSR finds remaining vulnerabilities, the proper 
response would be to revisit the earlier phases and take other pointed actions to address 
root causes.  SDL emphasizes evaluating reports of vulnerabilities after the release of the 
product as it helps to detect and eliminate further security weaknesses before they are 
discovered in the field. 
 
2.2 OWASP CLASP 
 
OWASP CLASP (CLASP), like SDL, is also a process for building secure 
software. It includes 24 activities and also supplementary resources, which can be fitted to 
the development process that is used. CLASP’s activities are defined mainly from a 
theoretical angle and so the coverage of the activities is rather broad. CLASP is defined as 
a set of independent activities that have to be integrated in the development process. The 
choice of the activities and the order of execution are left open to make the development 
process more flexible. Furthermore, the execution density of these activities is specified to 
each activity, so the coordination of these activities is fairly difficult. 
Two roadmaps (Legacy and Greenfield) have been made to give help on how to combine 
the activities into an ordered set.  
  CLASP defines the roles that are crucial for the security of the software product and 
appoints the activities to these roles, so the roles are used to help to structure the set of 
activities. Roles are responsible for the final outcome and the quality of the results of an 
activity. CLASP has a large set of security resources that support the implementation of the 
activities. For instance, it has a Vulnerability Lexicon that helps developers to avoid 
common coding errors in source code and Vulnerability Use Cases to portray conditions 
under which security services can become vulnerable in the software. The CLASP process 
8 
 
is presented through five high-level perspectives called CLASP Views. These views are 
broken down into activities which in turn contain process components. 
Figure 2 CLASP Views and their interactions (adapted from OWASP 1, 2012) 
Education in CLASP is mandatory for all people involved in the project. Awareness 
programs are implemented, using external expert resources in order to help to ensure that 
activities promoting secure software will be implemented effectively. 
  CLASP emphasizes the construction of the security team and they recommend 
assigning a security officer to the project, which shares knowledge and reviews the project 
throughout the development process. Furthermore CLASP recommends the use of 
accountability to boost individual commitment and also has security metrics to assess the 
security of the product.  CLASP emphasizes the importance of making corporate security 
policy to use as a base for security requirements and it provides templates to ease the 
making of this security policy.  
  CLASP recommends identifying data resources and linking them to system roles. 
Requirements are created by using both offense and defence by means of threat modelling 
and requirements specification. Threat modelling can be use case driven, during which 
attacks to use cases are performed and resource driven that concentrates on illegal use of 
resources. Functional security requirements are set to show how the basic security services 
are addressed for each resource for determining risk mitigation and resolving deficiencies 
and conflicts. CLASP also recommends identifying the attacker profile, so it would be 
simpler to specify where threats could originate.  
  CLASP supports threat modelling for architectural and detailed design. It includes 
assessing security posture of technology solutions to research and assess third party 
components that the project will depend on. CLASP is also devoted to minimize the attack 
surface by concentrating on restricting access. CLASP advises designers to apply security 
principles to design to harden and make software more resilient to attacks. 
  CLASP acknowledges importance of testing, but focuses more on the white box 
testing. It suggests automating security analysis and metrics by using dynamic or static 
tools. CLASP deals with creation of necessary documentation to install and operate the 
software safely and suggests reviewing the specifications from the developer’s perspective 
in order to spot any ambiguities. In verification phase CLASP suggests penetration testing 
to ensure that all issues have been caught. 
  CLASP recommends verifying security attributes of resources to confirm that 
software is meeting previously defined standards. It suggests code signing to provide the 
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stakeholders with a way to validate the origin of the software.  Following the release 
CLASP states that reported vulnerabilities should be addressed by updating software. 
 
2.3 Cigital’s Security Touchpoints 
 
  Cigital’s Security Touchpoints (Touchpoints) provides a set of best practices that 
have been gathered over the years out of the extensive industrial experience. Best practices 
are grouped together into seven touchpoints. Touchpoints recognize the importance of risk 
management and tries to bridge the gap by elaborating a Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) that supports the Touchpoints activities. Touchpoints are a mix of destructive and 
constructive activities. Destructive activities are attacks, exploits, and breaking software. 
These kinds of things are represented by the black hat. Constructive activities are about 
design, defence, and functionality and these are represented by the white hat. In order to 
make it easier for companies, different touchpoints are in ranking: 1. Code review, 2. 
Architectural risk analysis, 3. Penetration testing, 4. Risk-based security tests, 5. Abuse 
cases, 6. Security requirements, 7. Security operations. 
 
Touchpoints does not cover education before project launch. It is recognized that 
people should be trained about the particularities of the development environment, but 
there is no mandatory education to the personnel involved in building the secure software. 
A knowledge management framework is described to share software security knowledge 
among the project team. 
  Touchpoints describes an improvement program (McGraw 2006 p: 247-251) in 
order to adopt the best practices. This program assigns which part of the project will be 
done by whom, how the team will build and deploy it and also how they will continue to 
improve it over time. Improvement program also has a metric system put in place in order 
to demonstrate how well things are going from a security perspective. The improvement 
program will be tailored to the given business and technical situations. 
  Touchpoints advises abuse cases to be used in order to describe the system’s 
behaviour under attack. Two critical activities of abuse cases are: creating an anti-
requirements and creating an attack model.  Anti-requirements are for describing what can 
go wrong and attack model is for describing how it can be achieved. Touchpoints also 
suggests creating a risk management framework (RMF) (McGraw 2006 p: 59) to identify 
and keep track of risks over time as software project evolves. Extra security requirements 
are based on three sources: laws and regulations, commercial considerations and 
contractual obligations. Touchpoints also emphasize knowledge requirement as 
architectural risk analysis is knowledge intensive. 
  For architectural design the main focus is on threat modelling, but also risk analysis 
is introduced to identify risks in the system and mitigate them. Risk analysis consists of 
Figure 3 Software security best practices are applied to various software artefacts. 
(adapted from McGraw, 2006) 
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attack resistance analysis, ambiguity analysis and weakness analysis. Attack resistance 
analysis is meant to capture the checklist-like approach to risk analysis taken in Microsoft's 
STRIDE approach. Ambiguity analysis helps to uncover ambiguity and inconsistency and 
identify downstream. Weakness analysis is a sub process aimed at recognizing the impact 
of external software dependencies. Touchpoints also recommend a security expert to this 
phase.  
  Touchpoints emphasize the importance of testing by introducing risk-based security 
testing. Risk-based security testing is a mix of constructive and destructive activities that 
requires a black-and-white box approach. Testers must ground both the system’s 
architectural reality and the attacker's mind-set. By identifying risks in the system and 
creating tests driven by those risks, a software security tester can properly focus on areas of 
code where an attack is likely to succeed. Touchpoints also suggests using automated tools 
as it is the best way to identify the most basic of implementation defects and it 
recommends penetration testing for a system in its final production environment. 
Touchpoints also acknowledges unit testing as an important part of security testing. Unit 
testing carries the benefit of breaking system security down into a number of discrete parts.  
  For release and deployment Touchpoints covers the importance of event-
monitoring and event-logging as they will be effective during incident response operations. 
 
2.4 Comparison 
 
In this part we provide comparison between SDL, CLASP and Touchpoints in six 
different categories: education, project launch, risk analysis and requirements, architectural 
and detailed design, implementation and testing, release and deployment. Categories are 
implemented from SDL phases as CLASP and Touchpoints activities can be categorized 
similarly. Activities are SDL, CLASP and Touchpoints activities that each lifecycle 
recommends to fulfil in order to assure secure system. 
 
2.4.1 Education 
 
In Table 1 we compare three processes in education criteria. SDL and CLASP both 
emphasize education before project launch by instituting security awareness program and 
providing advanced education, but SDL goes one step further by measuring the knowledge 
gained from those activities. Touchpoints does not provide any activities for educating 
team members before the project launch. 
 
 Activity  Description SDL CLASP Touchpoints 
Institute security awareness 
program 
Ensure project members consider security 
to be an important project goal through 
training and accountability. 
1 1 0 
Provide advanced education Members of the team that do not directly 
deal with security issues should be aware 
of the project’s security practices. 
1 1 0 
Measure knowledge gained Provided metrics are used to measure 
knowledge gained through training 
programs. 
1 0 0 
Sum 3 2 0 
Table 1 - Education 
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2.4.2 Project launch 
 
  In Table 2 we compare SDL, CLASP and Touchpoints in activities relating to 
project launch. All three processes recommend assembling a security team and monitoring 
implementation success. However, SDL and CLASP are different from Touchpoints by 
also recommending security advisor for the team. CLASP has the most activities regarding 
project launch as they also recommend instituting accountability and identifying global 
security policy. Touchpoints is unique by recommending improvement program. 
Table 2 - Project launch comparison 
 Activity  Description SDL CLASP Touchpoints 
Assemble security team Identification of the team that is responsible for 
tracking and managing security of the product 
1 1 1 
Appoint security advisor Team member or external auditor will be appointed to 
be security advisor, who will review work of other team 
members 
1 1 0 
Monitor implementation 
success 
A set of metrics is devised that product team can use to 
monitor their success in implementing the approach 
1 1 1 
Institute accountability Team members will be accountable for performing 
activities to satisfactory level 
0 1 0 
Institute improvement 
program 
A program which assigns which part of the project will 
be done by whom and how they will continue to 
improve it over time.  
0 0 1 
Identify global security 
policy 
Provide a way to compare the security posture of 
different products 
across an organization. 
0 1 0 
Sum 3 5 3 
 
2.4.3 Risk analysis and requirements 
 
  In Table 3 we compare the three processes in risk analysis and requirements 
criteria. SDL has the least activities in this stage of the project. It recommends threat 
modelling and specification of privacy requirements. Touchpoints and CLASP both 
suggest identifying attacker profile and usage of abuse cases and threat modelling. CLASP 
also advises identifying resources, trust boundaries, user roles and determining risk 
mitigation. Touchpoints, which has the most activities in this stage, suggests using anti-
requirements, attack model, risk management framework and also eliciting legal risks and 
knowledge requirement. 
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Tabel 3- Risk analysis and requirements comparison 
Activity  Description SDL CLASP Touchpoints 
Identify resources and 
trust boundaries 
Provide a structured foundation for understanding the 
security requirements of a system. 
0 1 0 
Identify user roles Define user roles and the resources that the role can 
access. 
0 1 0 
Identify attacker 
profile 
Identify potential groups that could be a threat as well 
as the gross resources one expects them to have. 
0 1 1 
Anti-requirements Documenting the things that software should not do. 0 0 1 
Abuse cases(misuse 
cases) 
Use cases that are meant to detail common attempted 
abuses of the system. 
0 1 1 
Attack model Given a set of requirements and a list of threats, 
cyclation through the list of 
known attacks is made and decided whether an attack 
applies to system under development 
0 0 1 
Threat modelling Assess likely system risks by 
analysing the requirements and design. 
1 1 1 
Privacy requirements Measures the sensitivity of the data that software will 
process from a privacy point of view. 
1 0 0 
Elicit legal and/or 
regulatory risk 
Elicit and manage security from laws and regulations 0 0 1 
Elicit knowledge 
requirement 
Advanced knowledge is required before continuing to 
next phase of the development 
0 0 1 
Risk management 
framework 
Risk management framework 
encompasses identifying, synthesizing, ranking, and 
keeping track of risks throughout 
software development. 
0 0 1 
Determine risk 
mitigation 
Identify what risks could be considered, then identify 
solutions for addressing those risks. 
0 1 0 
Sum 2 6 8 
 
2.4.4 Architectural and detailed design 
 
  In Table 4 we compare the three processes in architectural and detailed design 
activities. SDL and CLASP are more thorough than Touchpoints in this phase. They both 
suggest minimization of the attack surface, researching and assessing security posture of 
technology solutions and reviewing threat modelling. SDL and Touchpoints both 
recommend attack resistance analysis, but Touchpoints also recommends ambiguity 
analysis. CLASP is unique by recommending annotating class designs with security 
properties and applying security principles to design. 
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Table 4 - Architectural and detailed design comparison 
 Activity  Description SDL CLASP Touchpoints 
Minimization of attack 
surface 
Specification of  all entry points to a 
program in a structured way and 
minimization of those entry points  
1 1 0 
Research and assess security 
posture of  technology 
solutions 
Assess security risks in third-party 
components. 
1 1 1 
Annotate class designs with 
security properties 
Elaborate security policies for 
individual data fields. 
0 1 0 
Review threat modelling Assess likely system risks by 
analysing the requirements and design. 
1 1 0 
Perform attack resistance 
analysis 
Identify general flaws using secure 
design literature and checklists 
1 0 1 
Apply security principles to 
design 
Harden application design by applying 
security design principles. 
0 1 0 
Perform ambiguity analysis The ambiguity analysis takes 
advantage of the multiple points of 
view afforded by multiple analysts to 
create a critical analysis technique. 
0 0 1 
Create data flow diagrams Used to graphically represent a system 1 0 0 
Sum 5 5 3 
 
2.4.5 Implementation and testing 
 
  In Table 5 we compare SDL, CLASP and Touchpoints in implementation and 
testing criteria. SDL, which has the most activities in this phase, is unique by 
recommending coding and testing standards, fuzz testing and security push. It is similar to 
CLASP and Touchpoints by suggesting usage of automated tools and penetration testing. 
CLASP which has the least activities suggests integrating security analysis into source 
management process. Touchpoints focuses mainly on testing as it recommends risk-based 
security testing and unit testing. 
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Table 5 – Implementation and testing comparison 
 
2.4.6 Release and deployment 
 
  In Table 6 we compare the three processes in activities relating to release and 
deployment. SDL and CLASP have the most activities in this stage as they both suggest 
conducting independent review of the software and updating it regularly. CLASP also 
recommends code signing and SDL suggests evaluating reports of vulnerabilities. 
Touchpoints, which has the least activities, suggests event-monitoring and event-logging 
after the release. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Activity  Description SDL CLASP Touchpoints 
Apply coding and testing 
standards   
1 0 0 
Implement automated tools 
  
1 1 1 
Perform penetration testing Method of evaluating the security of a 
computer system or network by 
simulating an attack from malicious 
outsiders and malicious insiders  
1 1 1 
Perform fuzz testing Software testing technique that 
involves providing invalid, 
unexpected, or random data to the 
inputs of a computer program. 
1 0 0 
Integrate security analysis into 
source management process 
Automate implementation-level 
security analysis and metrics 
collection. 
0 1 0 
Perform risk-based security 
testing 
Covers functionality testing and 
emulates the steps that an attacker will 
take when breaking a target system. 
0 0 1 
Perform security push Team-wide focus on threat model 
updates, code review, testing, and 
documentation scrub. 
1 0 0 
Unit testing Method by which individual units of 
source code are tested to determine if 
they are fit for use. 
0 0 1 
Sum 5 3 4 
15 
 
Table 6 – Release and deployment 
 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
 Security development models play an important role in developing a secure system 
and as we can see they all focus on different stages in development process. SDL has the 
most activities in education, design and implementation. CLASP concentrates mainly on 
project launch and risk analysis and Touchpoints emphasizes the importance of risk 
analysis and security requirements. Choosing the process depends on what development 
stage is the most important from stakeholder perspective. We selected risk analysis phase 
for further analysis, because we believe it is the phase that has the biggest effect on 
developing a secure system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Activity  Description SDL CLASP Touchpoints 
Conduct independent 
review of software 
Independent review of the software conducted 
by the security team. 
1 1 0 
Perform code signing Provide the stakeholder with a way to validate 
the origin and integrity of the software. 
0 1 0 
Evaluate reports of 
vulnerabilities 
 1 0 0 
Update software   1 1 0 
Perform event-
monitoring 
Process of collecting, analysing, and signalling 
event occurrences to subscribers. 
0 0 1 
Perform event-logging Provides system administrators with 
information useful for diagnostics and auditing 
0 0 1 
Sum 3 3 2 
16 
 
Chapter 3. Risk Analysis and Requirements: Survey Design 
 
  In this chapter we have conducted a systematic literature review (SLR). The SLR 
was carried out by effectuating the following activities: defining research question, source 
selection, studies selection process and information extraction.  
 
Figure 4 – Design of systematic literature review 
 
3.1 Research question 
 
   We defined the following research question: “What are the current practices and 
methods for security risk management?” After carrying out this SLR we expect to find out, 
which activities current security risk management methods cover in Table 3 and also 
provide a link between found methods and security development processes. 
3.2 Source selection 
 
  We picked sources which are of the recognized quality within the research 
community and possibly can contain answers for our research question. These sources are: 
 Requirements Engineering Journal (REJ) 
 Computers & Security – Journal (COSE) 
 Information Security Technical Report (ISTR) 
 International Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering (CAISE) 
 International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) 
 European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) 
 Information Security Journal (ISJ) 
 International Journal of Secure Software Engineering (IJSSE) 
3.2 Source 
selection 
3.1 Defining 
research question 
3.3 Studies 
selection 
Information 
4. Information 
extraction 
Selected studies 
Selected sources 
Research question 
Result of Security Lifecycle Survey 
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In the selected sources, we experimented with various search string criteria. That which 
eventually retrieved the highest number of useful results was: 
(security risk management) AND (methods OR study OR review OR practices). 
3.3 Information extraction 
 
  Having defined the source selection, we implemented procedures to identify those 
studies that provided direct evidence to the research question. First we implemented 
criteria that studies have to be published in last 3 years to be current practices and methods 
for security risk management. After that we found initial studies by reading the title, 
abstract and introduction. Studies which were not related to the research question were put 
aside.  
  Next we reviewed the studies that had been selected and found out if they contain 
activities in Table 3. Out of those studies we selected two methods Secure i*(Elahi, et al., 
2010) and SecReq (Houmb, et al., 2009).  
  After finding only two methods we wanted to expand our literature review and to 
expand it, we went through the references of our found methods. The outcome was the 
selection of five other methods for security risk management. Those methods were Secure 
Tropos (Giorgini, et al., 2007; Haralambos, et al., 2007), UMLsec (Jürjens, 2002), 
SQUARE (Suleiman & Svetinovic, 2012; Stehney & Mead, 2005), ISSRM domain model 
(Mayer, et al., 2006; Alcalde, et al., 2009; Mayer, et al., 2008) and Misuse cases (Sindre & 
Goguen, 2004). 
 
Table 7 - Summary of the studies selected. 
Sources REJ COSE ISTR CAISE ARES ECIS ISJ IJSSE 
Total 
results 
23 11 21 5 12 36 40 23 
Results 
selected 
3 
 
0 1 0 2 0 0 3 
Selected 
studies 
(Guerses, et al., 
2011), (Elahi, et 
al., 2010), 
(Houmb, et al., 
2009) 
 (Jirasek, 
2012) 
 (Beckers, 
2012), 
(Jakoubi, 
2010) 
  (Islam, et al., 
2013), 
(Nhlabatsi, et 
al., 2010), 
(Khan, 2012) 
 
3.4 Threats to validity 
 
  The main threat to validity is that whether we have failed to find all the relevant 
studies, although we have selected a wide range of conferences and journals, there may 
still exist relevant papers that we have not included. This may be caused by faulty search 
string criteria or limited source selection. Another threat may come from different 
interpretation of the methods selected. As selected methods’ activities may not accord 
exactly to Table 3 definitions, it may result in some studies, which interpret the accordance 
of the methods to Table 3 differently from our study.  
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3.5 Summary 
 
  To carry out the systematic literature review, we defined our research question: “What are 
the current practices and methods for security risk management?” After that we picked 
sources that are of recognised quality and selected 7 different methods out of the studies 
that we found. These 7 methods are Secure Tropos, UMLsec, SQUARE, ISSRM domain 
model and Misuse cases. In the next chapter we will extract information from found 
methods to compare them to each other and provide an aggregate view of those seven 
security risk managent methods. 
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Chapter 4. Risk analysis and Requirements: Result Analysis 
 
  In this part we have created Table 8 from Table 3 to see which activities from 
security development processes each method covers. We have also composed reviews of 
selected methods and description how each method covers its activities. 
 
 
4.1 Secure i* 
 
The i* framework provides the basic setting for representing vulnerabilities that are 
brought by actions and assets and propagating them through the decomposition and 
dependency links to other elements of model (Elahi, et al., 2010). The modelling process 
consists of five views: requirements view, vulnerabilities view, attackers template view, 
attackers’ profile view and countermeasures view. Identification of resources and user roles 
is done by requirements view that shows stakeholders and actors with their goals, the tasks 
to achieve those goals, required resources and the dependencies among them. Threat 
modelling is done by vulnerabilities view that extends the requirements view by adding 
vulnerabilities that tasks and resources bring to the system and what impact these 
vulnerabilities have to the system. Attack model is in the attackers’ template view that 
represents how an attacker can exploit the vulnerabilities. Attacker profile is identified in 
Table 8 – Comparison of methods for security risk management  
 Activity  Definition Secure 
i* 
SecReq Secure 
Tropos  
UMLsec SQUARE ISSRM 
domain 
model 
Misuse 
cases 
Sum 
Identify 
resources 
and trust 
boundaries 
Provide a structured foundation 
for understanding the security 
requirements of a system. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Identify user 
roles 
Define user roles and the 
resources that the role can 
access. 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Identify 
attacker 
profile 
Identify potential groups that 
could be a threat and define 
their skillset and motivation for 
the attack as well as the gross 
resources one expects them to 
have. 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
Anti-
requirements 
Documenting the things that 
software should not do. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Abuse 
cases(misuse 
cases) 
Use cases that are meant to 
detail common attempted 
abuses of the system. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Attack 
model 
Model that shows goals and 
methods that attacker may use. 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Threat 
modelling 
Assess likely system risks by 
analysing the requirements and 
design. 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Privacy 
requirements 
Measures the sensitivity of the 
data that software will process 
from a privacy point of view. 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Determine 
risk 
mitigation 
Identify what risks could be 
considered, and then identify 
solutions for addressing those 
risks. 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 5 
Sum 6 2 5 2 5 5 6  
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attackers’ profile view. The attackers’ profile view captures the attacker’s goals, skills and 
behaviour. Risk mitigation is done in countermeasure view that shows the security 
solutions adopted by actors to protect the system as well as their impacts on attacks and 
vulnerabilities. 
4.2 SecReq 
 
SecReq is a security requirements elicitation and tracing method built on the CC 
standard, The Heuristic Requirements Assistant (HeRA) tool, and UMLsec. The elicitation 
part consists of five steps that take a developer through a series of refinement steps starting 
from system objectives and functional requirements and ending with specific security 
requirements at an early stage (Houmb, et al., 2009). The SecReq method consists of six 
steps. In first step we must identify resources and trust boundaries by specifying security 
objectives from system objectives and functional requirements. These requirements are 
refined from security objectives. In step two we need to identify user roles by 
distinguishing users or groups of end-users so they are properly authenticated to the 
system. In step 3 we refine security objectives to sub security objectives. Sub security 
objectives are a refinement of security objectives and are a detailed description of the 
relevant part of the secure environment for end-users of the system specified by the 
security objective (Houmb, et al., 2009). Step 4 takes the result from Step 3 and refines the 
sub security-objectives into security requirements. Step 5 takes the result from Step 4 and 
refines it to requirements that are specific, measurable, achievable, realisable and traceable. 
Throughout Steps 1–5 the HeRA tool observes requirements inputs and raises warning and 
hints when security-related input is detected. In step 6 we capture the results of step 5 and 
integrate them into UML diagrams by using UMLsec stereotypes. 
4.3 Secure Tropos 
 
Tropos is a software development methodology tailored to describe both the 
organisational environment of a system and the system itself. Secure Tropos extends the 
original Tropos methodology with some new concepts: a security constraint, secure 
entities, ownership, provisioning, trust of permission, trust of execution, delegation of 
permission, delegation of execution, secure trust of permission, secure delegation of 
permission (Giorgini, et al., 2007). Secure Tropos starts with identifying user roles, 
resources and trust boundaries is done by modelling stakeholders and actors with their 
goals, producing an actor diagram and extending the actor diagram with trust and 
ownership relationships. Next we identify privacy requirements by modelling the security 
constraints to identify secure capabilities for each actor. Threat modelling is done by 
security reference modelling. Security reference modelling involves identification of 
security needs, threats and vulnerabilities and also possible solutions to the security 
problems. 
4.4 UMLsec 
 
  The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is the industry-standard in object-oriented 
modelling. It offers an unprecedented opportunity for high-quality critical systems 
development that is feasible in an industrial context (Jürjens, 2002). UMLsec is an 
extension for Unified Modeling Language that allows to express security relevant 
information within the diagrams in a system specification (Jürjens, 2002). UMLsec’s 
security requirements are encapsulated in UML stereotypes, tags in the UMLsec profile 
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and constraints. UMLsec identifies resources and trust boundaries using statecharts, 
sequence diagrams and class diagrams. Statecharts give the object behaviour, while class 
diagrams define the static structure of the system and sequence diagrams ensure 
correctness of security-critical interactions between objects (Jürjens, 2002). UMLsec 
defines user roles by defining actors using activity diagrams and showing their rights to 
access a protected resource. Threat modelling is done using threat scenarios in deployment 
diagrams. 
4.5 SQUARE method 
 
The security quality requirements engineering (SQUARE) method is a security 
requirements engineering method developed by Nancy Mead. SQUARE consists of nine 
steps: agree on definitions, identify security goals, develop artefacts to support security 
requirements definitions, perform risk assessment, select requirements elicitation 
technique, elicit the security requirements, categorize the security requirements, prioritize 
the security requirements, and inspect the security requirements. The steps include 
identifying suitable techniques to systematically perform each step (Suleiman & 
Svetinovic, 2012).  
  SQUARE specifies five artefacts: system architecture diagrams, use cases, use-case 
diagrams, attack trees and security template. Architecture diagram identifies resources and 
trust boundaries. Resources are defined by security goals, which can be derived from 
business application goals or potential threats to assets. and user roles are demonstrated in 
use cases and use-case diagrams. In SQUARE threat modelling is done by the security 
template. The security template is a modified version of the Software Engineering 
Institute’s security template. The template specifies: source - specifies the weakness, threat 
or vulnerability point, stimulus - specifies the first action triggering the event that reveals 
the security threat, artefact - specifies the data or system services that attackers want to 
attack, specifies the status of the environment before an attack, action - specifies the actions 
that attackers plan to perform by exercising specific vulnerability, consequence - specifies 
the results or the effects of an attack. Attack model is described by attack trees that capture 
the security weakness points in the system and show us the goals and methods that attacker 
may use. Risk mitigation is done by using National Institute of Standards and Technology 
risk assessment method (Stoneburner, et al., 2002). This method has five steps: threats 
identification, vulnerabilities identification, likelihood analysis, impact analysis and risk 
determination. 
4.6 ISSRM domain model 
 
The objective of ISSRM is to protect assets of an organisation, from all harm to IS 
security which could arise accidentally or deliberately, by using a risk management 
approach. Its domain model aims at presenting the different concepts involved and their 
mutual relationships. ISSRM core concepts are organised in three categories: asset-related 
concepts, risk-related concepts and risk-treatment related concepts (Alcalde, et al., 2009).  
  In first category we must identify resources and trust boundaries by defining which 
assets are important to protect and what are their security needs. In second category we 
must identify attacker profile by describing threat agents and their potential attacks to an 
asset. Attack model is formed by describing the vulnerabilities that an attacker exploits and 
the effect that the attack will have on an asset. In third category threat modelling is done by 
analysing the security requirements and linking them to found risks. Furthermore we 
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determine risk mitigation by describing how to treat the identified risks.  
 
4.7 Eliciting security requirements with misuse cases 
 
Misuse Cases is described as a sequence of actions, including variants that a system 
or other entity can perform, interacting with misusers of the entity and causing harm to 
some stakeholder if the sequence is allowed to complete (Sindre & Opdahl, 2004). 
  Eliciting security requirements with misuse cases consists of five steps. In first step 
identification of resources is done by identifying critical assets in the system. In second 
step security goals are added to each asset identified in first step. In third step attacker 
profile is identified by identifying misusers that may harm the system or its environment 
and also attack model is provided by describing attackers’ goals and methods. Threat 
modelling is done in fourth step, where risks are identified and analysed. In fifth step risk 
mitigation is done by defining countermeasures. Misuse cases compliment identifying 
security threats, which can be described as misuse cases and misusers and also security 
requirements can be described by misuse cases. 
 
4.8 Comparison 
 
  In this part we provide comparison between an extended i* meta-model, SecReq, 
Secure Tropos, UMLsec, SQUARE, ISSRM domain model and Misuse cases. It is clear 
that all of these methods provide a structured foundation for understanding the security 
requirements of a system. All of these methods, except ISRRM domain model and Misuse 
cases, identify user roles. Attacker profile is identified in Secure i*, ISSRM domain model 
and Misuse cases. Anti-requirements are not included in any of these methods. Abuse 
cases are used in method Misuse cases. All of these methods, except SecReq, provide 
threat modelling, but Secure i*, SQUARE, ISSRM and Misuse case provide us also with 
attack models. Secure Tropos is the only method that measures the sensitivity of the data 
that software will process from a privacy point of view. ISSRM and Secure Tropos also 
acknowledge that data’s confidentiality and integrity are important, but no actual 
measurement is given. UMLsec and SecReq are the two methods that do not provide 
solutions for addressing security risks of a system. 
 
4.9 Security development models and risk management methods 
 
 In Table 3 we can see that in risk analysis and requirements stage SDL consists of 
threat modelling and privacy requirements. In Table 8 the only method that covers these 
activities is Secure Tropos. Secure i*, UMLsec, SQUARE, ISSRM domain model and 
Misuse Cases can also be used in SDL as they cover threat modelling. CLASP consists of 
seven activities that are also in Table 8. These activities are identify resources and trust 
boundaries, identify user roles, identify attacker profile, abuse cases, threat modelling and 
determining risk mitigation. There is no method in Table 8 that covers all of these 
activities. Misuse Cases covers all other activities requested for CLASP, except identify 
user roles. Secure i* covers everything except abuse cases. Both Secure Tropos and 
SQUARE cover four activities required in CLASP. Those activities are identify resources 
and trust boundaries, identify user roles, threat modelling and determining risk mitigation. 
ISSRM domain model also covers four activities, but instead of identifying user roles, 
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attacker profile is needed. UMLsec consists of three activities that are also requested for 
CLASP: identify resources and trust boundaries, identify user roles and threat modelling. 
SecReq cover the least activities for CLASP as it identifies resources, trust boundaries and 
user roles. Touchpoints consists of four activities that are also in Table 8: identify attacker 
profile, anti-requirements, abuse cases and attack model. None of the methods we have 
chosen cover anti-requirements. However, all other Touchpoints activities can be covered 
with Misuse cases, which combined with anti-requirements cover all Touchpoints 
activities.  Identification of attacker profile and an attack model is also provided in Secure 
i* and ISSRM domain model. SQUARE can also be used as it provides an attack model. 
Anti-requirements are used in the work of van Lamsweerde (2004), where he introduces 
anti-models and anti-goals to document the things that software should not do.  
 
4.10 Summary 
 
  Security risk management methods are important part of development process for 
secure software, however the choice between the methods can be rather difficult. Difficulty 
comes from the structure of the methods. Even if the methods execute the same activity, 
they may do so by using different artefacts, definitions and means to do so. For example in 
Secure i* attack model is in the attackers’ template view that represents how an attacker 
can exploit the vulnerabilities and in SQUARE attack model is described by attack trees 
that capture the security weakness points in the system and show the goals and methods 
that attacker may use. Stakeholders are the ones who have to choose which technique is the 
best for system under development and Table 8 can only serve as a guideline to their 
selection process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Chapter 5. Aggregate view on the Risk Analysis and 
Requirements 
 
  Identifying resources and trust boundaries. To identify resources and their 
trusted boundaries, one can use the ISSRM domain model, where the conceptual base for 
assets and their security criteria is defined. This can guide the combined application of 
SecReq and SQUARE. For instance resources and trust boundaries in SecReq are defined 
as security objectives, which are derived from system objectives and functional 
requirements. In SQUARE resources are considered for the security goals. They are 
elicited from business application goals and through consideration of protected threats. 
Analysis techniques for this activity include Secure i*, Secure Tropos, Misuse Cases and 
UMLsec. Resources and trust boundaries are identified in Secure i* by modelling required 
resources and goals. Similarly it is done in Secure Tropos. Misuse Cases treat resources as 
critical assets in the system. UMLsec suggests means to define objects and produces 
statecharts, sequence diagrams and class diagrams to give the object behaviour and 
interactions between objects.  
  Identifying user roles. Application guidelines to identify user roles are given in 
SQUARE, which demonstrates how to use modelling techniques (e.g. use cases) to identify 
actors and processes. Analysis techniques for identifying user roles include Secure i*, 
Secure Tropos and UMLsec. In Secure i* user roles are identified modelling stakeholders 
and actors with their goals and the tasks to achieve those goals. Similarly it is done in 
Secure Tropos, but they extend it with trust and ownership relations. UMLsec defines the 
actors using activity diagram and shows their rights to access a protected resource.  
  Identifying attacker profile. ISSRM domain model gives the application 
guidelines for identifying attacker profile by guiding the definition of threat agent. Secure 
i* and UMLsec provide the analysis techniques for this activity. In Secure i* attacker 
profile is identified by defining the actor that can exploit the vulnerabilities to have a 
negative impact towards the system. In Misuse Cases the attacker is defined as misuser that 
wants to misuse the system under consideration. 
  Abuse cases (misuse cases). Analysis technique for abuse cases is given by Misuse 
Cases that identifies security threats and security requirements, which then can be 
described by misuse cases. 
  Attack model. Application guidelines for attack model are given by ISSRM 
domain model and Misuse Cases. The ISSRM domain model describes vulnerabilities of 
the system that an attacker exploits and the effects that an attack has on an asset. In 
Misuse Cases attackers’ goals and methods are described to provide an attack model. 
Secure i* and SQUARE provide the analysis techniques for composing an attack model. In 
Secure i* attack model is depicted as attackers’ template view that represents how an 
attacker can exploit the vulnerabilities in the system. SQUARE describes attack trees that 
capture the security weakness points in the system and show us the goals and methods that 
attacker may use.  
 Threat modelling. Secure i*, SQUARE, ISSRM domain model and Misuse Cases 
give the application guideline for threat modelling. In Secure i* threat modelling is done 
by describing vulnerabilities that tasks and resources bring to the system and also 
describing the impact that these vulnerabilities have to the system. In SQUARE threat 
modelling is done by specifying the weakness in the system, threat that the weakness 
brings, the action triggering the attack, the data or system service that attacker wants to 
attack, the status before the attack, the attackers plan and consequences of the attack. 
Misuse Cases says that to do threat modelling, it is necessary to identify and analyse found 
risks. ISSRM domain model defines the security requirements of the system and links them 
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to found risks. Analysis techniques for threat modelling are provided by Secure Tropos and 
UMLsec. Secure Tropos does security reference modelling that consists of identifying 
security needs, threats and vulnerabilities. UMLsec covers threat modelling by threats 
scenarios in deployment diagrams.  
 Privacy requirements. Privacy requirements are carried out only in Secure Tropos, 
which gives the analysis technique for it. Privacy requirements are covered by modelling 
the security constraint to identify secure capabilities for the actors. 
  Determine risk mitigation. Guidelines for determining risk mitigation are given 
by the ISRRM domain model and Misuse Cases. ISSRM domain model insists on 
description how to treat the identified risks. In Misuse cases countermeasures are defined 
to found risks. Analysis techniques are given by Secure i*, Secure Tropos and SQUARE. 
Secure i* determines risk mitigation by showing the security solutions adopted by actors to 
protect the system and also their impact on attacks and vulnerabilities. In Secure Tropos 
risk are mitigated by security reference modelling, where possible solutions to security 
problems are shown and in SQUARE threats and vulnerabilities are identified using 
National Institute of Standards and Technology risk assessment method (Stoneburner, et 
al., 2002). It includes threat’s likelihood analysis, impact analysis and risk determination.  
Table 9 - Aggregate view on the Risk Analysis and Requirements 
 Identify 
resources 
and trust 
boundaries 
Identify 
user roles 
Identify 
attacker 
profile 
Abuse 
cases(mi
suse 
cases) 
Attack 
model 
Threat 
modelling 
Privacy 
require
ments 
Determine 
risk 
mitigation 
Conceptual 
definition 
ISSRM 
Domain 
model 
       
Application 
guidelines 
SecReq, 
SQUARE 
SQUARE ISSRM 
domain 
model 
 ISSRM 
domain 
model, 
Misuse 
Cases 
Secure i*, 
SQUARE, 
ISSRM 
domain 
model, 
Misuse 
Cases 
 ISSRM 
domain 
model 
,Misuse 
Cases 
Analysis 
techniques 
Secure i*, 
Secure 
Tropos, 
Misuse 
Cases, 
UMLsec 
Secure i*, 
Secure 
Tropos, 
UMLsec 
Secure 
i*, 
Misuse 
Cases 
Misuse 
Cases 
Secure 
i*, 
SQUA
RE 
Secure 
Tropos, 
UMLsec 
Secure 
Tropos 
Secure i*, 
Secure 
Tropos, 
SQUARE 
Related Work 
 
  Comparison of risk management methods has also been done by Fabian et al., 
(2009). They presented a conceptual framework for security requirements engineering that 
established a common vocabulary and made interrelations between different concepts used 
in security engineering. Using the presented framework they compared different risk 
management methods.  SQUARE, UMLsec, Secure Tropos and Secure i* are methods that 
are provided in their comparison as well as ours. They divided their methods into six 
different approaches: multilateral approach, UML-based approaches, goal-oriented 
approaches, problem frame-based approaches, risk analysis-based approaches and common 
criteria-based approaches. Similar division can be seen in our aggregate view Table 9, 
except we do not assign a method into one category, but rather appoint a method into a 
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category for each activity.  Another comparison has been done by Kalloniatis et al.,(2004). 
They compare requirements engineering methods under the scope of helping eGovernment 
application development. Secure i* and Tropos are methods that are covered in their 
comparison as well as ours. They conclude with the need for a combination of methods, 
which would cover all aspects of security requirements modeling, which we trying to 
achieve by giving stakeholders an aggregate view of our chosen methods. SecReq (Houmb, 
et al., 2009) is also a combination of risk management methods. They use Heuristics, 
Common Criteria, and UMLsec to provide one complete risk management method. 
Difference comes from the quantity of methods and the criteria being followed. While in 
Houmb et al.,(2004) work they formulate their own criteria that methods have to fulfil, we 
follow the criteria given by security development models. Despite there existing 
comparisons of different risk management methods, we did not find any related works that 
connect risk management methods to security development processes.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
  Security development models like SDL (Lipner & Howard, 2005), CLASP 
(Graham, 2006) & Touchpoints (McGraw, 2006) are made to improve the security of 
software products by recommending series of security activities and although they serve 
the same purpose, the activities they recommend vary greatly depending on the phase of 
development. In this thesis we gave the answer to the following research question: what 
are the differences between SDL, CLASP & Touchpoints? Current security risk 
management methods are also composed to improve the security of the software, but their 
coverage of the development is much smaller as they usually cover only one phase of the 
development. To see which activities risk management methods cover, we answered the 
question: what are the current practices and methods for security risk management? After 
finding out current security risk management methods, we developed an aggregate view on 
risk analysis and requirements to find the similarities between found methods, so it would 
be easier to combine them in providing a secure software system. 
 Our literature review was limited to one phase of security development processes, 
because of limited time and manpower. In future, other phases of security development 
processes (e.g. architectural and detailed design) can be covered similarly with a literature 
review. That would give us a complete overview of methods that are needed to complete 
these security development processes. Also aggregate view on risk analysis and 
requirements can be completed by finding new methods that would give conceptual 
definitions or application guidelines to activities, where they are missing. 
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Uuring turvalise tarkvara arenguprotsesside kohta 
 
Silver Jürimäe 
Bakalaureusetöö (6 EAP) 
 
  Turvalise tarkvara arendusprotsessidel on tähtis roll turvalise tarkvara 
kavandamisel, aga erinevate arendusprotsessidel vahel on rakse valikut teha ilma 
nendevahelie võrdluseta. Veel enam peale arendusprotsessi rakendamist tuleb valida 
meetodid, mida kasutada selle arendusprotsessi rakendamisel. Meetodite valikul tekib aga 
probleem, sest arendusprotsessides ei ole öeldud, milliseid meetodeid tuleks kasutada, et 
täita vajalikud tegevused turvalise tarkvara arendamiseks. 
  Selle töö raames me võrdleme kolme erinevat turvalise tarkvara arendusprotsessi: 
Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle, OWASP CLASP ja Cigital’s Security 
Touchpoints. Järgmisena me keskendume valitud arendusprotsesside faasile, mis käsitleb 
turvariskide haldust ja viime läbi uuringu, et teada saada, mis on tänapäevased turvariski 
meetodid. Me anname nendest meetoditest lühikokkuvõtte ja võrdleme neid omavahel, mis 
loodetavasti lihtustab nende vahel valimist. Me koostame veel leitud meetoditest ühise 
vaate, mis aitab kaasa kõigi arendusprotsesside poolt pakutud tegevuste täitmisele selle 
faasis. See on vajalik, sest riskihaldus mängib suurt rolli turvalise tarkvara arendamisel ja 
erinevate riskihaldus meetodite kombineerimist saab kasutada, et avastada rohkem riske 
loodavast tarkvarast ja hiljem neid riske korrektselt leevendada. 
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